Should assisted dying be legalised? by Thomas D G Frost et al.
Frost et al. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2014, 9:3
http://www.peh-med.com/content/9/1/3MEETING REPORT Open AccessShould assisted dying be legalised?
Thomas D G Frost1, Devan Sinha2 and Barnabas J Gilbert3*Abstract
When an individual facing intractable pain is given an estimate of a few months to live, does hastening death
become a viable and legitimate alternative for willing patients? Has the time come for physicians to do away with
the traditional notion of healthcare as maintaining or improving physical and mental health, and instead accept
their own limitations by facilitating death when requested? The Universities of Oxford and Cambridge held the
2013 Varsity Medical Debate on the motion “This House Would Legalise Assisted Dying”. This article summarises the
key arguments developed over the course of the debate. We will explore how assisted dying can affect both the
patient and doctor; the nature of consent and limits of autonomy; the effects on society; the viability of a proposed
model; and, perhaps most importantly, the potential need for the practice within our current medico-legal framework.
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Over the past two centuries, the United Kingdom has
experienced rapid population growth associated with a
substantial decline in mortality from acute infectious
diseases and poor nutrition [1]. As the average life ex-
pectancy has increased, so too have the rates of debilitat-
ing chronic illness – particularly coronary artery disease
and cancers [2]. These diseases require years of treat-
ment instead of the mere days to weeks that medicine
once operated within [2]. Although healthcare systems
have sought to adapt to such changes, aiming to prevent
and treat such disease wherever possible, debate has
arisen regarding those patients in the latter stages of
chronic, incurable, terminal conditions [3,4]. Moreover,
there is increasing recognition that the patient must be
at the centre of health care decision-making, such that
outcomes must be tailored to their individual needs and
views. By extension, assisted dying might seem a logical
step to help achieve these goals within the realm of end-
of-life decision making [5]. Several jurisdictions, notably
Oregon (1997) and the Netherlands (2001) have already
legalised assisted dying in some form. These factors have
contributed to ongoing legislative discussions within
Parliaments for almost a decade, with current opinion
polling suggesting a majority of medical practitioners
and the public in favour of physician-assisted suicide [6].* Correspondence: Barnabas.gilbert@gtc.ox.ac.uk
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stated.Viability of assisted dying in practice
In the UK, a model for assisted dying has been devel-
oped from the legal structure found within the Assisted
Dying Bill introduced by Lord Falconer in the House of
Lords in 2013 [7]. Assisted dying could only be consid-
ered under circumstances in which a patient of legal age
is diagnosed with a progressive disease that is irrevers-
ible by treatment and is “reasonably expected to die
within six months” [7]. Registered medical practitioners
would make such decisions for patients with terminal ill-
nesses. Addressing the technicalities of ‘assisted dying’
requires distinction between ‘physician-assisted suicide’
(offering patients medical actions or cessation of actions
by which they can end their own life) and ‘euthanasia’
(whereby the medical practitioner actively induces
death). In light of the strong hostility of the medical pro-
fession towards active euthanasia, this proposed model,
as with previous attempts to legalise assisted dying, per-
mitted only the former [8-10].
However, there is concern that such distinction may be
unrealistic in practice because medical practitioners could
find themselves with a patient who had failed to success-
fully end their own life and was subsequently left in a
state of greater suffering. Were such a patient no longer
able to give consent, a heavy burden would then be placed
on the physician regarding how to proceed. Moreover, the
practice of physician-assisted suicide might be deemed
discriminatory, for example by giving only patients with
good mobility control over their own method of death.d. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication
ain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise
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that any terminal prognosis must be confirmed and
attested by a second registered practitioner. The strict-
ness of such criteria has parallels to a similar double-
physician requirement when procuring a legal abortion
under the 1967 Abortion Act. The stated aims of the
provision in both cases are as follows: first, to check the
accuracy of the prognosis upon which the decision was
being made; second, to ensure that the situation meets
the required criteria; and third, to check that such a de-
cision was taken by the patient after full consideration of
all available options [11,12]. By having a second inde-
pendent doctor, the legislation ensures that all three
checks are met without prejudice or mistake.
Problematic for any protocol for assisted dying is the
fact that estimates of life expectancy in terminal progno-
ses are erroneous in 80.3% of cases [13]. Furthermore,
the accuracy of such prognoses deteriorates with in-
creased length of clinical predicted survival. Forecasts of
survival times are based largely on past clinical experi-
ence, and the inherent variability between patients
makes this more of an art than a science. This brings to
concern both the accuracy of any prognosis meeting the
six-month threshold and the validity of requests for
assisted dying based partly or wholly on predicted sur-
vival times. Whilst the majority of errors in life expect-
ancy forecasts are a matter of over-optimism and hence
would not affect either of those two concerns, many
cases remain unaccounted for. Overly pessimistic fore-
casts occur in 17.3% of prognoses; hence we must decide
whether the one in six patients making a decision based
on an inaccurate prognosis is too high a cost to justify
the use of this system. Patients requesting an assisted
death often cite future expectations of dependency, loss
of dignity, or pain [14]. If the hypothetical point at which
the progression of their illness means they would con-
sider life to be not worth living is not, as informed, mere
weeks away but in fact many more months, then this in-
formation would have resulted in a different decision
outcome and potentiated unnecessary loss of life.
Whilst the presence of a second doctor would be ex-
pected to mitigate such forecasting errors, the anchoring
bias of the initial prediction may be enough to similarly
reduce the accuracy of the second estimate. It is prudent
to question the true independence of a second medical
practitioner, and whether this second consultation could
become more of a formality, as has now become the
case with abortion [15].
Another challenge for an assisted dying system would
be to recognise whether patients requesting death were
legally competent to make that decision. Consider that
any request for suicide from a patient with clinical de-
pression is generally categorised as a manifestation of
that mental disorder, thereby lacking capacity. It isarguably impossible to separate out the natural reactions
to terminal illness and clinical depression. Indeed, there
is evidence that major depressive disorders afflict be-
tween 25% and 77% of patients with terminal illness
[16,17]. Any protocol for assisted dying must first deter-
mine what qualifies as a ‘fit mental state’ for a terminal
patient.
The need for assisted dying
It could be argued that a doctor’s fundamental duty is to
alleviate forms of suffering in the best interests of the
patient. The avoidance of physical pain, as an obvious
manifestation of suffering, might explain why assisted
dying would be both necessary and within the duties of
a doctor to provide. The evolving principle in common
law known as the ‘Doctrine of Double Effect’ offers a so-
lution to this problem [18]. This legal judgement stated
that “[a doctor] is entitled to do all that is proper and
necessary to relieve pain even if the measures he takes
may incidentally shorten life”. This entails that a proto-
col already exists for patients searching for an escape
from chronic pain. Furthermore, numerous retrospective
studies have revealed very little correlation between opi-
oid dose and mean survival times: one study of over 700
opioid-treated patients found that the variation in sur-
vival time from high-dose opioid treatment is less than
10% [19-21]. It can therefore be said that pain alone, if
appropriately managed, should never be cause for con-
sidering assisted dying as an alternative.
By contrast, the ‘Doctrine of Double Effect’ might be
seen as a subjective interpretation that has been applied
unequally due to a lack of specialist training or know-
ledge [22]. Despite this, the principle can be easily
understood and poor awareness can be remedied by im-
provements in medical education and standardisation of
protocols. Moreover, should we choose to accept argu-
ments for assisted dying that are based upon inadequate
administration of pain medication, we set a precedent
for conceding shortcomings in palliative care and other
end-of-life treatments. Offering hastened death could
become an alternative to actively seeking to improve
such failings.
Whilst much has been made of the ‘pain argument’
here, the call for assisted dying is rarely this simple.
Many patients also suffer a loss of dignity, often due to
their lack of mobility – the inability to relieve oneself
without help is a potent example. Beyond this are add-
itional fears of further debilitation and the emotional
costs of dealing with chronic illness, both for the patient
and for their relatives and friends. A study of terminal
patients in Oregon showed that these were the most sig-
nificant reasons behind requests for assisted suicide, the
next commonest reason being the perception of them-
selves as a ‘burden’ [14]. Clearly, we could seek to
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patients, and still fail to address these points.
Developments in healthcare and technology may re-
duce this emotional burden, but remain an imperfect
solution.
Rights of patients and limitations of their autonomy
J. S. Mill’s pithy dictum describes autonomy as follows:
“over himself, over his own body and mind, the individ-
ual is sovereign” [23]. Not only has the sanctity of bodily
autonomy profoundly influenced the development of lib-
eral democracies, it has also provoked a holistic shift in
making our healthcare systems more patient-centred –
“care that meets and responds to patients’ wants, needs
and preferences and where patients are autonomous and
able to decide for themselves” [5]. The ethical principle
of controlling the fate of one’s own body is inherently
relevant to the debate on assisted dying. It is difficult to
reconcile that citizens may have the right to do almost
anything to and with their own bodies– from participat-
ing in extreme sports to having elective plastic surgery –
yet a terminal patient cannot choose to avoid experien-
cing additional months of discomfort or loss of dignity
in their final months of life.
Expectation of individual liberty has been codified in
law. The right to bodily autonomy has been interpreted
to be included under Article 8 - the right to privacy - of
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
and subsequently the Human Rights Act (HRA) [24,25].
Moreover, the ECHR underpins the right of individuals
to ‘inherent dignity’ [26]. Hence, if an individual feels
that dignity is unattainable due to the progression of a
terminal illness, then taking recourse though assisted
dying ought to be a legitimate option.
Conversely, there are two notable oversights in this in-
terpretation of a right to assisted dying as an extension
of the principles of bodily autonomy:
First, it would be wrong to view individual liberty as
absolute. The HRA allows for exceptions to Article 8 on
grounds of ‘health or morals’ [25]. The principle of au-
tonomy is not inviolable. Governments have limited
such privileges for the protection of individuals and soci-
ety, for example by criminalizing the use of recreational
drugs or the selling of one’s own organs. The preserva-
tion of life by denying assisted dying could fall within
this category.
Second, the right of autonomy is not necessarily
intrinsic to human beings but, as Kant argued, is
dependent on our ‘rational nature’ [27]. This concept
sees autonomy as an exercise of ‘evaluative choice’ [27],
requiring rationality on the part of individuals to appre-
ciate the nature of options and their consequences. To
achieve true autonomy, there must be sufficient informa-
tion to make those rational decisions; this is the basis ofinformed consent and why it is a fundamental duty of a
doctor to offer a patient an informed series of treatment
options [28]. The logistical issue is that doctors are un-
able to advise patients regarding the point at which their
situation becomes less preferable to being dead. No doc-
tor (or individual) has any knowledge or experience of
what ‘death’ may be like. Hence, in this case, the idea of
exercising true autonomy through informed consent
might be considered meaningless.
Legalising assisted dying by attempting to establish an
absolute right to bodily autonomy may undermine other
individual and group rights. Vulnerable patients may feel
pressured into assisted dying because of social, emo-
tional, or financial strains placed on family and/or
friends. This is exemplified by the trend showing that
the proportion of patients stating ‘relief of burden’ on
others as the reason for requesting assisted dying has
risen from 17% to 25% in Oregon since legalisation [29].
One could even consider the risk of assisted dying be-
coming an expected choice rather than a free one. Thus,
assisted dying may erode the elemental right to life of
terminal patients as the value of their life becomes tied
to relative costs to society and to those around them.
Moreover, by creating one class of individuals for
whom life is expendable, that particular view may be ex-
tended by society to all groups possessing such attributes
(e.g. the permanently disabled). There would be a defin-
ite risk to the rights of these vulnerable groups in the
form of society being less willing to provide for their
health and social care.
It is often raised that the limited legalisation of assisted
dying would inevitably become extended in scope, but
this is not necessarily a flaw. Even if the right to deter-
mine the manner of death were later extended to a wider
group of people, posterity may reflect positively on such
a change, just as extending the franchise to women ul-
timately led to legislation demanding equal pay.
Effect on health professionals and their role
‘To act in the best interest of the patient’ is often
cited as a central duty of the doctor [28]. This concept
of ‘best interest’ guiding the doctor’s action has seen
the development of two important ethical principles:
beneficence and non-maleficence. Beneficence man-
dates that the actions of the doctor must be aimed to
bring about benefit (clinical improvement) for the pa-
tient, usually measured in terms of reduced morbidity
or mortality; non-maleficence requires that the doctor
not carry out treatment that is likely to cause overall
harm the patient [30]. These traditional ethical impera-
tives on a doctor both conflict with intentionally has-
tening the death of a patient, and a resolution of this
tension would require redefining what constitutes ‘acting
in the best interest’.
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health professionals to engage in a practice that contra-
venes their own ethical beliefs, particularly as this would
affect doctors who never entered training in the know-
ledge that assisting patients to die would be an expected
duty. This is certainly no argument against the introduc-
tion of assisted dying; indeed, a recent survey of a cohort
of NHS doctors found that 46% would seriously consider
requests from patients to undertake steps to hasten
death [31]. It merely expresses the point that any early
model would have to account for the fact that an initial
54% of the doctors in the NHS would be required to ad-
vise qualifying patients of assisted dying as a legitimate
option, despite disagreeing with it in principle.
Furthermore, doctors who agree ethically with this
practice may find themselves facing conflicts of interest.
It is expensive to treat chronically ill patients, particu-
larly in the final months of life [32]. Moreover, it would
be difficult for commissioners to ignore the fact that the
sustained treatment of one individual could deprive
many others from access to surgery or access to novel
drugs. Such an argument does not suggest that doctors
or any other hospital staff would treat this practice with-
out appropriate respect or care; rather it acknowledges
the need for appropriate rationing of care and questions
the intentions of service providers. The perception of an
ulterior motive could negatively impact patient trust.
One survey showed that a reasonable minority of pa-
tients (27%) – and particularly particularly the elderly –
believe that legalising assisted dying would lessen their
trust in their personal physician [33]. The costs of weak-
ened trust in the doctor-patient relationship could far
outweigh the benefits of assisted dying, particularly given
the importance of trust when treating a chronic patient
for an extended period of time.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that assisted dying would empower
some patients to maximise control over the timing and
manner of their own death. Such expression of auton-
omy would surely solidify moves towards a patient-
centred approach to healthcare. However, the capacity
for such consensual requests remains in doubt. Clinic-
ally, the patient’s state of mind and the reliability of diag-
nostic predictions are of issue; philosophically, the idea
of informed consent for death is contradictory. The im-
plications for patients, physicians and society have been
weighed extensively within this article. The central tenet
throughout has been the balancing of an individual’s
right to escape a circumstance that they find intolerable,
alongside the consequential changes to their other
rights, and the rights and responsibilities of third parties.
Ultimately, the challenge is for us as a society to decide
where this balance lies.About the debate
The Varsity Medical Debate was started in 2008 with the
aim of allowing students, professors and members of the
polis, to engage in discussion about ethics and policy
within healthcare. Utilising the age-old rivalry between
the two Universities, the debate encourages medical stu-
dents from both Oxford and Cambridge to consider and
articulate the arguments behind topics that will feature
heavily in their future careers.
The debate was judged on the logic, coherence, and
evidence in arguments, as well as flair in presentation.
Although the debaters may not have necessarily agreed
with their allocated side, the debate format required
them to acknowledge a particular school of thought and
present the key arguments behind it. Oxford, who op-
posed the motion, was awarded the victory in the debate;
however, this does not mean that the judges believe that
position ought to become public policy.
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